By the way, it is a well-known fact - in the Tor browser based on Firefox, Google, despite changing the exit node (or the entire chain of 3 nodes) and deleting cookies with all other site information (leave the YouTube site, delete everything, change the chain of nodes), still determines in some cases that the new IP with a new exit point is used by the same client and blocks access - even a hundred changes of exit points/chain and preliminary deletion of cookies and other information available through the browser form do not help. Only exiting the Tor browser and loading it again helps, despite the fact that the form for deleting cookies and other site information, together with changing entry-exit points, should in theory do the same. Let's move on. In countries with censorship, it quickly became clear that the "protection" of browsers based on encrypted DNS, i.e. access to sites via services like cloudfare does NOT work in fact, the censorship system still determines the presence of the required site address, despite the supposedly fully encrypted traffic even at the level of supposedly DNS requests - although encrypted site traffic + encrypted DNS (otherwise what's the point?) in fact should be a complete analogue of a VPN tunnel, when neither the provider nor the censorship systems know where and how the traffic goes.
The world is not at all what corporations with their supposed "user security" policy present to us. Everything is exactly the opposite regarding the fact that they lie to people.
NikoB.